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1. Introduction
Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic
justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with
each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken
into account.1 More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well-
placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences).2
In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention
to the case of credences and the notion of probability involved in their treatment. I argue
that the notion of probability in question can only be an epistemic (or evidential) kind
of probability. I conclude that the resulting theory will be incompatible with Reliabil-
ism in one important respect: it cannot deliver on the reductivist promise of Reliabilism.
I also argue that attention to the justification of basic beliefs reveals limitations in the
Evidentialist framework as well. The theory that results from the right combination of
Evidentialism and Reliabilism, therefore, is neither Evidentialist nor Reliabilist.
2. Evidentialism
Evidentialism has been defined by Conee and Feldman (1985) as follows:
Evidentialism: Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically
justified for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at
t.
Three questions need to be answered before we have a full understanding of Evidential-
ism: what kinds of things can be evidence?; what is it for subject to have some evidence?;
and what is it for a body of evidence to fit a doxastic attitude?
Conee and Feldman themselves have a conception of evidence and its possession accord-
ing to which two subjects in the same total (non-factive) mental states cannot differ in
what evidence they possess. But one can combine Evidentialism with other conceptions
1See, for instance, Comesaña (2010a), Comesaña (2010b) and Goldman (2011). An important precursor is
Alston (1988) (although Alston doesn’t explicitly discuss Evidentialism).
2See Dunn (2015), Tang (2016b) and Pettigrew (ms).
1
of evidence and its possession and end up with a package of views which denies the su-
pervenience of epistemic justification on (non-factive) mental states. For instance, if one
thinks of evidence as consisting of true propositions or facts and its possession as consist-
ing in knowledge, then two subjects can be in the same (non-factive) mental states and
yet differ on what evidence they have.3,4 A third option is to say that evidence consists of
propositions, and that experiences (even when non-veridical) provide these propositions
as evidence.5 This is in fact the position I favor, and I will come back to it below.
One kind of mentalist Evidentialism (at least inspired by Conee and Feldman), then,
would answer our three questions as follows: evidence is constituted by mental states,
in particular by justified beliefs and experiences; a subject has some evidence just in case
he is in the relevant mental state; and the fitting relation between bodies of evidence
and doxastic attitudes is a primitive, non-reducible epistemic fact.6 Notice the apparent
circularity in the answer to the first question: Evidentialismhas it that justification super-
venes on evidence, and we are told that justified beliefs can be evidence. This circularity
is benign provided that one thinks justification has a recursive structure. In very rough
terms, the idea is that experience (together perhaps with ostensible memories) provides
us with prima facie non-inferential justification, and beliefs thus justified by experience
can combine to produce further justified doxastic attitudes. I come back to this issue
below.
Evidentialism is a theory ofpropositional justification—ofwhat it is for a doxastic attitude
to be justified for a subject, independently ofwhether the subject adopts that attitude. We
also need a theory of doxastic justification—ofwhat it takes for an attitude to be justifiedly
adopted. It won’t do just to say that an attitude is doxastically justified just in case it
is propositionally justified and adopted: subjects may adopt the right attitudes for the
wrong reasons. Conee and Feldman themselves propose the following theory of “well-
foundedness” to add to their Evidentialism:
3The equation of evidence with knowledge is from Williamson (2000), and the parenthetical regarding
non-factive mental states is designed to make room for Williamson’s own conception of knowledge as itself a
mental state. In what follows I omit the qualification.
4Supervenience may be too weak a notion to capture the essence of Evidentialism. The traditional defini-
tion of supervenience, applied to our case, is simply that there cannot be a difference as to what attitudes are
justified for some subjects without there being a difference as to which evidence those subjects have. Combined
with a mentalist conception of evidence and its possession, this yields the further supervenience thesis to the
effect that there cannot be a difference as to which attitudes are justified for some subjects without a difference
in the mental states they are in. But, plausibly, the Evidentialist and the Mentalist want more than mere su-
pervenience: they may want not just the existence of a mere co-variation, but a constitutive relation between
justification and evidence. If it turns out, say, that justification and mental states co-vary in the requisite way
only because they in turn co-vary with a third condition, the resulting view need not be particularly friendly to
Evidentialism. An analogy may help bring the point home. Suppose that we define Physicalism as the thesis
that every fact supervenes on physical facts. That thesis is compatible with Cartesian substance dualism, as
long as the non-physical stuff exists necessarily. Maybe the supervenience thesis is interesting in its own right,
but conceiving of physicalism as compatible with substance dualism does not get the spirit of the view right.
Analogously, one would have thought that Evidentialism would have to be incompatible with non-evidential
facts determining epistemic justification, even when they obtain necessarily.
5For a development of this view, see Comesaña and McGrath (2014) and Comesaña and McGrath (2016).
6Conee and Feldman themselves hold that there is no such thing as unpossessed evidence. They seem to
think of evidence, then, as token, instantiated mental states, rather than uninstantiated types—see Conee and
Feldman (2008).
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S’s doxastic attitude D at t toward proposition p is well-founded if and only
if:
(i) having D toward p is justified for S at t; and
(ii) S has D toward p on the basis of some body of evidence e, such that
(a) S has e as evidence at t;
(b) having D toward p fits e; and
(c) there is no more inclusive body of evidence e’ had by S at t
such that having D toward p does not fit e’.
Notice that Conee and Feldman are relying here on the notion of basing an attitude on
a body of evidence. The Evidentialist notion of well-foundedness is thus importantly
different from the Evidentialist notion of justification. To see the difference, consider
the Williamsonian theory of evidence briefly alluded to earlier: items of evidence are
facts, and they are possessed by a subject when they are known by that subject. That
Williamsonian theory of evidence, as we said before, is compatible with at least the let-
ter of Evidentialism. On the Williamsoninan view, a proposition can be justified for a
subject by either being sufficiently supported by the evidence the subject has or by be-
ing part of that evidence (in which case it trivially counts as being sufficiently supported
by the evidence).7 There will therefore be no difference in the justificatory status of any
proposition for any subjects without a difference in the evidence possessed by those sub-
jects. Suppose, however, that we add to that kind of the theory the claim that one can be
justified in believing the propositions which are part of one’s evidence even if one does
not base that belief on any evidence. Indeed, barring controversial cases of higher-order
evidence, justification for believing the propositions which are part of one’s evidence will
in general require that one not base those beliefs on any evidence. Rather, those basic
beliefs will be the result of direct knowledge by different modalities, for instance by look-
ing. When you know that there is a snowball in front of you because you see it, it is part
of your evidence that there is a snowball in front of you, and you are justified in believing
that there is a snowball in front of you, but your belief that there is a snowball in front of
you is not based on any evidence you have (your belief is certainly not based on itself, and
you may have no other relevant evidence). The resulting view, however, is not compati-
ble with the well-foundedness theory of basing, for that theory requires that all of one’s
justified beliefs be based on evidence. I return to this important issue below.
Why the need for clause (ii)(c)? Conee and Feldman’s idea here is that even if the part of
the subject’s evidence on which he bases his attitude does indeed fit that attitude, there
may be other parts of his evidence which don’t. Suppose, for instance, that I believe that
Fred is older than 9, and that I base this belief on the evidence that I have that Fred has
gray hair. Compatible with all that, it may also be part of my evidence that Fred suffers
from a condition that may cause premature greying of the hair. Moreover, what matters
is which attitude my total evidence justifies—for it may also be part of my evidence that
7Williamson has recently added to his epistemology the claim that a body of evidence fully justifies a propo-
sition only if it entails it—see Williamson (2013) and Williamson (forthcoming), and cf. Cohen and Comesaña
(2013), Cohen and Comesaña (forthcoming) and Comesaña (2017).
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Fred goes to college. In that case, my belief would be well-founded only if based on those
three relevant pieces of evidence, and it wouldn’t be if based only on the color of Fred’s
hair.8
One advantage of evidentialism and the accompanying notion ofwell-foundedness is that
it applies to doxastic attitudes in general, and not just to beliefs. Thus, our evidence can
fit disbeliefs and suspensions of judgments aswell as beliefs, and theymay also fit degrees
of beliefs (credences).
One can have misgivings about different aspects of this kind of Evidentialism. The main
worry that I am interested in now focuses on its primitivism, on the fact that it doesn’t
have much to say about why certain bodies of evidence “fit” certain doxastic attitudes.
Reliabilism promises to deliver on precisely that front, but it faces problems of its own.
3.Reliabilism
Goldman (1979) is responsible for establishing Reliabilism as a theory of epistemic justi-
fication. A rough version of such Reliabilism has it that a belief is justified if and only if it
is produced by a reliable belief-forming process. A bit less roughly, a belief is justified if
and only if it is produced by a belief-independent belief-forming process and that process
is reliable, or it is produced by a belief-dependent belief forming process (i.e., a process
some of whose inputs are the contents of some of the subject’s beliefs) and that process is
conditionally reliable (i.e., it tends to produce true beliefs given that its belief-dependent
inputs are true).
Such Reliabilism is subject to three different kinds of objections. First, the objection that
reliability is not necessary for justification. Second, the objection that reliability is not
sufficient for justification. Third, the objection that we have no principled way of mea-
suring the reliability of a belief-forming process. The first objection arises from Cohen’s
“new evil demon” problem (Cohen (1984)), the second from BonJour’s clairvoyant cases
(BonJour (1980)), and the third from Conee and Feldman’s “generality problem” (Conee
and Feldman (1998)—the problem was already noticed by Goldman (1979)).
The generality problem is more fundamental than the other two, because even formu-
lating the other two problems presupposes an answer to the generality problem. The
generality problem arises from the fact that any token belief-forming process will belong
to an indefinite number of belief-forming process-types. It is usually assumed that relia-
bility can only be defined for types, because types (but not tokens) are repeatable.9 But if
any token belongs to indefinitely many types, and if those types differ in reliability, then
we need a principled way to select a type for each token. For instance, if I believe that it
is precipitating based on my belief that it is raining, then the token process instantiates
8Depending on one’s account of the basing relation, one may hold that the belief need not be based on an
all three items of evidence. In any case, the main point is that the belief will not be justified if based only on
the fact that Fred has gray hairs.
9Comesaña (2006) argues against this assumption that we can make sense of the reliability of a token
process, but also notes that this will not help Reliabilists avoid the generality problem.
4
the type of believing a proposition on the basis of another proposition which entails it,
but also the type of believing a proposition about the weather on the basis of another
proposition about the weather, and the reliability of those two types differ substantially.
Once we have a solution to the generality problem (that is to say, once we have a princi-
pled way of associating each token belief-forming process with a type to be assessed for
reliability) we need to figure out how the reliability of that type is evaluated. This will be
the task of a later section.
Cohen’s new evil-demon problem and BonJour’s clairvoyant problem assume that we
have a solution to the generality problem and an answer to the question of how to assess
the reliability of belief-forming process-types. In particular, Cohen’s new evil-demon
problem assumes that the beliefs of a victim of an evil-demon are not produced by reli-
able belief-forming processes, and, given that they are justified, concludes that reliability
is not necessary for justification. BonJour’s clairvoyant problem assumes that the beliefs
of a genuine clairvoyant are reliably produced, and, given that they are not justified, con-
cludes that reliability is not sufficient for justification.
A different kind of objection is that whereas Reliabilism as developed can account (per-
haps) for the justification of beliefs, it is not clear how to adapt it to other doxastic atti-
tudes. Within the realm of coarse-grained epistemology, we could try the following: just
as a belief is justified if the process that produced it is reliable, so too disbelief is justified
if the process is anti-reliable (or, equivalently, if the process which produces the belief
in the negation of the relevant proposition is reliable), and suspension of judgment is
justified if the process is neither reliable nor anti-reliable. And within fine-grained epis-
temology, we could perhaps try the following: a degree of belief (or credence) is justified
if and only if it matches the degree of reliability of the process that produced it. Those
options might well work,10 but they raise the same issue we touched upon above: how
to measure the reliability of a belief-forming process-type. Before tackling that issue,
however, we need a solution to the generality problem.
4. How to Solve the Generality Problem
Alston (1988) proposes a version of reliabilism according to which a belief is justified just
in case it is based on an adequate ground, where the adequacy of a ground is a matter of
its reliability. In place of Alston’s grounds, we can invoke the notion of evidence. This
will give us a principled way of selecting a type for each belief-forming process-type: the
type believing that p on the basis of e. Remember that Evidentialists themselves appeal
to this notion of basing in their account of well-foundedness. It is that typewhich should
be assessed for reliability. This is what I proposed in Comesaña (2006). My proposal
was the following:
Well-Founded Reliabilism (first pass): A belief that p by S is epistem-
ically justified if and only if:
10Although see Tang (2016a) for more on how Reliabilists should capture suspension of judgment.
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(i) S has evidence E;
(ii) the belief that p by S is based on E; and
(iii) the type producing a belief that p based on evidence E is a
reliable type.
That proposal, however, ignores the reasoning behind clause (ii)(c) of the evidentialist
definition of well-foundedness. Recall the reason: if I base my belief on a subset of my
evidence which justifies it, but ignoring some other evidence which I have which does not
justify it, thenmy belief is not well-founded. Taking that into account yields the following
refined version of well-founded reliabilism:
Well-Founded Reliabilism: A belief that p by S is epistemically justified
if and only if:
1. S has evidence E;
2. the belief that p by S is based on E;
3. the type producing a belief that p based on evidence E is a reliable type;
and
4. there is no more inclusive body of evidence E’ had by S at t such that
the type producing a belief that p based on evidence E’ is not a reliable
type.
Notice that if we bracket clause 2, what is left is a definition of propositional justification
for Reliabilism.
When assessing Evidentialism, we said that the theory needed an account of evidence
and its possession. Well-founded Reliabilism inherits those needs, and the same options
canvassed earlier are available here as well. In fact, however, a further development
of Well-Founded Reliabilism will provide us with an argument for a specific account of
evidence. I turn to that development next.
5. How to Measure Reliability
We have a solution to the generality problem insofar as we have a principled way of se-
lecting a process-type for any token process of belief formation. But this doesn’t yet give
us a complete reliabilist theory, for we need to figure out how to measure the reliability
of a process type.
One possible answer is to think of the reliability of a process as the truth-to-falsity ratio
of its outputs. There are two varieties of this truth-ratio conception of reliability: relia-
bility as actual high truth-ratio, or reliability as counterfactual high truth-ratio. The first
one counts a process as reliable if and only if the ratio of truths to falsehoods within its
actual outputs is sufficiently high, whereas the second one concerns not just actual truth-
ratios but counterfactual ones as well. A counterfactual conception is preferable insofar
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as there may be processess which, although intuitively justification-conferring, do not
have many actual outputs, and so its actual truth-ratio may be coincidentally low. Go-
ing to a counterfactual account of reliability is not without issues, however, because one
needs to restrict the relevant range of counterfactual applications in order to not trivialize
the account. This issue with the counterfactual account is reminiscent of the generality
problem, for we need to decide which of the counterfactual applications of the process
are the relevant ones to measure reliability.
A different measure of reliability has also been proposed by Alston (and used in Come-
saña (2009)): reliability as high conditional probability. The idea here is that a type of
the form believing that p based on e is reliable if and only if, for some suitable probability
functionPr and some suitable threshold r,𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝑒) ≥ 𝑟. Two immediate questions about
that approach are: what is a suitable probability function, and what is a suitable thresh-
old? A third issue has to do with Carnap’s distinction between confirmation as firmness
and confirmation as increase in firmness.11 𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝑒) can be greater than r even if edoesn’t
raise the probability of p—indeed, for 𝑟 < 1 it can happen that 𝑟 < 𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝑒) < 𝑃𝑟(𝑝). If
this is the case, then we can hardly say that it is e which justifies the subject’s belief that
p. This need not be a problem for the Reliabilist who appeals to the notion of evidence
only to solve the generality problem, and who doesn’t take himself to be elucidating the
notion of evidential justification, but only justification simpliciter. It may, however, be
an issue for the Evidentialist—we’ll come back to this point later.
Let us leave those questions aside for the moment, and formulate the resulting version
of reliabilism:
Probabilistic Evidentialist Reliabilism: A belief that p by S is justified
if and only if:
1. S has evidence E;
2. the belief that p by S is based on E;
3. 𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝐸) ≥ 𝑟.
4. There is no more inclusive body of evidence E’ had by S such that
𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝐸) < 𝑟.
The resulting theory is called “Probabilistic Evidentialist Reliabilism” to honor the three
components that play a crucial role in it: evidence, reliability, and probability. One issue
with relying on the notion of probability is the problem of logical omniscience. Consider
the fact that one of the axioms in the usual Kolmogorov presentation of the probability
calculus states that all tautologies receivemaximal probability. Thismeans that a subject
will automatically be justified in being certain of any tautologywhatsoever, even those too
complicated for the subject to even parse. Different approaches to the problem of logical
omniscience have been attempted, but I will not adjudicate between them here. I will
here just note thatmy ownopinion on this issue is that the problemof logical omniscience
is serious, and it does show that epistemic justification simply cannot have a probabilistic
structure. However, that does not mean that we cannot appeal to probabilities in our
11See the preface to the second edition of Carnap (1950).
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theories, but just that we must be careful in what it is that we are modeling with them.
Of course logical omniscience is not rationally required, but if what we are interested in
a particular context is not the epistemology of logic, then we can safely bracket issues
having to do with logical omniscience and rely on a probabilistic structure for epistemic
justification.12 The reader can verify that none of the arguments that follow trade on so
bracketing those issues.
6. What is Pr?
The theory we have arrived at is very similar to one recently proposed by Tang (2016b),
which in turn, as noticed by Pettigrew (ms), is at least extensionally equivalent to a theory
proposed by Dunn (2015) (at least when Dunn’s theory is supplemented as we have done
here to deal with the generality problem) aswell a to Pettigrew’s own theory. The theories
do not incorporate the account of evidence as undefeated experience that I gave in the
previous section, but on the other hand they do answer a question that we have so far not
considered: namely, what is the probability function in whose terms we defined justified
credence? All three of Tang, Pettigrew and Dunn answer that it is an objective, non-
evidential probability which is in question. It is objective because it does not measure
the actual degrees of belief of any particular agent. But it is not an evidential probability
function, because it is not a measure of the degrees of belief it is rational to have. Or,
more precisely, it will turn out to be an evidential probability function in the end (after
all, the theories are all theories of justified credence), but only because the theories have
it that the evidential probability function just coincides with a non-evidential one. The
theories are trying to explain evidential probabilities, and they do so by appealing to a
non-evidential type of probability.
Pettigrew is the most explicit about this. He says:
Given Jenann Ismael’s distinction between single-case objective probabil-
ities and general objective probabilities, our notion falls under the latter
heading (Ismael (2011)). They are what Elliott Sober (2010) calls macro-
probabilities; they are what David Albert (2000) finds in classical statistical
mechanics. For Ismael, single-case probabilities tend to be unconditional,
and assign values to particular token events, such as this particular die land-
ing six on this particular roll. They are sometimes called chances, and they
are the sort of probabilities we find in quantummechanics. They are the ob-
jective probabilities that propensity accounts and best-system analyses aim
to explicate. General probabilities, in contrast, tend to be conditional, and
they take as arguments a pair of event types, such as dice of a certain sort
landing six given that they are rolled. These are the sorts of probabilities
that are found in statistical mechanics and evolutionary biology. They are
what frequentist accounts attempts to explicate.
And he goes on to provide some examples:
12See Williamson (forthcoming) for a development of this kind of view.
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Crucially, for our purpose, non-trivial general probabilities are possible even
in deterministic worlds, whereas non-trivial chances are not—indeed, it is
part of what it means for a world to be deterministic that the chance of an
event at any time is either 0 or 1. Thus, in such a world, any particular roll
of any particular die either is determined to come up six or is determined
not to come up six. Nonetheless, it is still possible in such a world that the
general objective probability of a diewith certain general physical properties
landing six given that it is rolled is 1 . Similarly, while it is determined by the
deterministic laws whether any particular egg in any human reproductive
system will survive to reproductive age or will not, there is nonetheless a
non-trivial probability that an egg will survive to reproductive age, given
that it is a human egg — and this is a general probability. And while it is
determined by the deterministic laws whether any particular block of ice in
warm water will or will not melt, there is nonetheless a non-trivial (though
very high) probability that a block of ice will melt given that it is in warm
water—again, this is a general probability.
Given that this is the nature of the probability function 𝑃𝑟, however, it is quite clear that
it will render all of the theories that appeal to it materially inadequate—they will all have
clear counterexamples. Moreover, the counterexamples will not be easily brushed-off as
marginal or somehow not terribly relevant—they strike at the heart of the theories, and
show that they are, simply put, wrong.
BonJour’s clairvoyant counterexample to Reliabilism was designed to show that relia-
bility is not sufficient for justification. I argued (in Comesaña (2009)) that a kind of
Reliabilism that incorporates evidentialist themes is not vulnerable to BonJour’s coun-
terexamples. However, I think now that counterexamples of the same kind can be given
even against sophisticated reliabilist theories that incorporate evidentialist notions, pro-
vided that they appeal to the kind of objective probability that Pettigrew is alluding to.
BonJour’s counterexamples rested on the fact that blind reliability doesn’t provide justi-
fication. Adding the notion of evidence to Reliabilism, I thought, provided a way out of
the blindness. But measuring reliability in terms of general objective probabilities blinds
Reliabilism once again, even when inoculated with evidence.
Suppose that you knowby seeing that a certain leaf has shape S. As it happens, the general
objective probability of its being the leaf of an oak tree given that it has shape S is 𝑛. You,
however, are no botanist, and know nothing about oaks and their leaves. Even if, by
chance, you happen to assign credence 𝑛 to the proposition that the leaf is an oak leaf,
that credence will in no way be justified. Or suppose that you know that a certain patient
has symptoms S. As it happens, the general objective probability of a person’s having
disease D given that they exhibit symptoms S is𝑚. You, however, are no physician, and
knownothing about diseaseD and its symptoms. Even if, by chance, youhappen to assign
credence𝑚 to the proposition that the patient exhibiting symptoms S has diseaseD, that
credencewill in noway be justified. Moreover, those credenceswill not be justified even if
your assignment of credences is done on the basis of the evidence in question. Suppose
that you base your credence about the leaf coming from an oak on the fact that it has
shape S, and you base your credence in the patient’s having disease D on the fact that he
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exhibits symptoms S. Far from this making your credence assignments rational, it just
highlights the role that blind luck is playing in your credence assignments—a kind of luck
incompatible with justification.
Now, it may be replied that if you have no idea about the connection between the leaf
shape and its provenance, or between the symptoms and its causes, then you are not re-
ally basing your credence assignments on the evidence. At best, the evidence is playing a
merely causal role in those credence assignments—but even advocates of causal accounts
of basing need to grant that the existence of a causal relation is not sufficient for epistemic
basing. Perhaps the subject also needs to somehow appreciate the connection between
the evidence and the doxastic attitude it justifies.
But this response cannot help the Evidentialist Reliabilist who appeals to an objective
type of probability. To begin with, it has a decidedly internalist flavor which no relia-
bilist worth the name (not even an evidentialist one) should be comfortable with. But,
more seriously, if we buy the idea that basing requires an appreciation of the bearing
of the evidence on the target doxastic attitude, not any old appreciation will do—it will
have to be a justified appreciation. For instance, if you also just happen to think that 𝑛
% of leaves with shape S belong to oaks, that will in no way make your credence assign-
ment more justified. And if your appreciation of the bearing of the evidence has to itself
be justified, then this launches a regress that ends either with some evidence giving you
doxastic justification even absent appreciation of its bearing, or with some such appre-
ciation being justified non-evidentially. But if the regress is resolved the first way that
just leaves the theory open to the original objection. For now we will have a case where
the subject assigns a credence n to a proposition p on the basis of some evidence E, and
while it is true that 𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝐸) = 𝑛, interpreting 𝑃𝑟 as a general objective probability,
the subject has no idea about the connection between E and p. On the other hand, if the
regress is resolved the second way, by saying that justified appreciations of the bearing
of evidence on doxastic attitudes may themselves be non-evidentially based, that is just
incompatible with the theories, which have the consequence that all justified attitudes
are evidence-based.
Cohen’s new evil demon objection to reliabilism was designed to show that reliability is
not necessary for justification. I argued (in Comesaña (2002)) for a solution to that ob-
jection based on a two-dimensional semantics for “reliable.” But the theories of Dunn,
Tang and Pettigrew do not incorporate that detail of my position. As such, they are vul-
nerable to Cohen’s objection—or a similar one at least. For suppose that a subject lives
in a counter-inductive environment. For instance, suppose that the environment puts
evolutionary pressure on bird species to have different colors.13 In that case, the general
objective probability of the hypothesis that all ravens are black diminishes as the number
of observed black ravens grows. Nevertheless, it would be irrational for a subject to be-
come more and more convinced that not all ravens are black the more black ravens she
observes.
Behind these specific counterexamples lies a more fundamental problem with appealing
to this kind of objective probability, and that is that it is a contingent kind of probability.
13Compare Titelbaum (forthcoming) on the “Hall of different-colored birds”.
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The value of a particular conditional probability of this kind depends on the contingent
regularities that obtain in the world. As such, it will only be rational to match one’s cre-
dences to those probabilities after one learns about the correlations. But learning is itself
an epistemic achievement, and involves rational belief. Therefore, the rationality of the
doxastic attitudes cannot be explained in terms of that kind of probability.
7. Evidential Probability
If𝑃𝑟 cannot be the kind of objective probability function that Dunn, Tang and Pettigrew
take it to be, then what is it? One obvious answer (one which I hinted at in Comesaña
(2009)) is: the evidential probability function. The evidential probability function deter-
mines two things: what credence it is rational to assign to different hypotheses in the
absence of any evidence for or against them, and (via the conditional evidential probabil-
ity function) what credences it is rational to assign to propositions given certain evidence.
It is also an objective kind of probability, but not contingent. It is the kind of probability
that Carnap (1950) tried (in vain) to define in purely syntactic terms. Since then, many
philosophers have equated the failure of the Carnapian project with a refutation of the
existence of such an evidential probability function. But, of course, the failure of the Car-
napian project does nothing of the sort: it just shows that the difference between, say,
“green” and “grue” is not syntactic.14
It is hard to find explicit formulations of that kind of skepticism in print, but Titelbaum
(2010) is an exception. In that paper, Titelbaum explains and generalizes the problem
that Goodman’s grue example (Goodman (1979)) poses for the existence of the evidential
probability function. Titelbaum’s argument explicitly involves the rejection of the claim
that the shape of the evidential probability function can be gleaned a priori. But if the
argument of the previous section against appealing to contingent probability functions
is on the right track, then the right probability function could only be gleaned a priori.
Titelbaumwould then applyModus Tollens and conclude that, therefore, there is no such
evidential probability function. Titelbaum ends his paper with a nod towards subjective
Bayesianisms according to which there is no unique evidential probability function, but
any probabilistically coherent credence distribution is acceptable. Not to put too fine a
point on it, that kind of subjectivism allows for any reaction to the evidence to be ratio-
nal. That is, in my case at least, literally unbelievable. But I agree with Titelbaum on the
options here: either we embrace the existence of an evidential probability functionwhich
cannot be determined syntactically, or we go full subjectivists—that is to say, relativists—
about epistemology. This kind of epistemological relativism is particularly vulnerable to
the self-undermining objection that most relativisms must face. That is to say, if Titel-
baum is right, then his argument for the correctness of his position should command
rational assent only for those who share Titelbaum’s priors. There is of course, vastly
more to say about these issues, and I say a little more in the next section.
The theory we have arrived at, then, is the following. First, the evidence a subject has at t
14I speak of “the” evidential probability function, thus committing myself to the uniqueness thesis in epis-
temology. As far as I can tell, however, the issues discussed here do not depend on this thesis.
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is provided the undefeated experiences the subject has. Second, the credences a subject
is justified in assigning at t are those determined by𝑃𝑟(−|𝐸), where𝑃𝑟 is the evidential
probability function and𝐸 is the subject’s evidence at t.
Let us now see how the appeal to evidential probabilities can answer the problems for re-
liabilism that we argued cannot be answered by appeal to an objective probability func-
tion. BonJour’s style of counterexample focused on cases where reliability is allegedly
not sufficient for justification. But if reliability is measured in terms of the evidential
probability function, then this kind of counterexample is impossible. For, simply put, if
a subject is not justified in believing a proposition p despite having evidencewhichmakes
p sufficiently likely according to a probability function 𝑃𝑟, then 𝑃𝑟 is not the evidential
probability function. Similarly, Cohen’s counterexamples require a situation where a
subject is justified in believing a proposition p even though the subject’s evidence makes
p unlikely according to 𝑃𝑟—but, again, that is only possible if 𝑃𝑟 is not the evidential
probability function. More generally, as I argued in the previous section, both BonJour’s
and Cohen’s counterexamples to reliabilism rely on measuring reliability according to a
function whose values are contingent. But the values delivered by the evidential proba-
bility function are not contingent.15
Now, in one respect, the fact that measuring reliability according to the evidential prob-
ability function relieves Reliabilism of its problems with counterexamples is, of course,
a welcome feature. In another respect, however, it might seem that the appeal to the
evidential probability function makes the reliabilist answer to alleged counterexamples
too easy. Relatedly, there is a circularity worry here: we are trying to give an account of
epistemic justification, and we end up appealing to the evidential probability function,
which just encodes under what conditions doxastic attitudes are justified. Moreover, we
are not giving an independent specification of the evidential probability function, but just
appealing to it, whatever it is. How, therefore, is this progress? I come back to this ques-
tion below. First, however, we need to reconsider the role of evidence in Evidentialist
Reliabilism.
8. Evidence and Credences
As mentioned before, Conee and Feldman themselves have a mentalistic conception of
evidence. The rough idea seems to be that certain special mental states—experiences
paradigmatically, but perhaps also apparent memories and other non-factive mental
states—“start the ball rolling,” in that they are the foundations of all justified belief. More
specifically, mentalism has it that these mental states are themselves evidence, and they
15In Comesaña (2010a) I argued that the mere appeal to evidence could answer BonJour’s counterexample.
To bemore precise, I granted thatmaybe BonJour’s counterexamples did show that reliability is only necessary
for justification, but I didn’t comment on the fact that this just means that Reliabilism thus conceived was at
best only a partial account of evidential fit. In that same paper I adopted my previous answer to Cohen’s new
evil demon problem presented in Comesaña (2002). In effect, my proposal there is one way tomake contingent
reliable connections into necessary ones. Given the necessity of evidential probabilities, this more roundabout
solution is not necessary.
12
give rise to evidentially (but non-inferentially) justified beliefs, which in turn can inferen-
tially justify further beliefs. In what follows I talk of experiences exclusively, but I mean
to leave it open that other mental states can also provide basic justification.
My worry about such a conception of evidence is that it is simply not plausible that the
fact that a subject is undergoing a certain mental state is evidence for propositions about
things completely unrelated to that subject and hermental states. Suppose that you know
nothing about a certain subject, and I tell you that she is undergoing a certain mental
state and ask you whether that is evidence (for her, presumably, but there is here an
interesting question about the privacy of evidence under the mentalist construal) for the
proposition that there is a snowball in a certain spatiotemporal position (right in front
of the subject, say). Knowing nothing of the subject and the nature of her mental states,
the experience is completely irrelevant to the existence of snowballs. It is just as if I
told you that there is a certain sentence written in the sand, and asked you whether that
sentence is evidence that there is life onMars. The obvious answer is that the sentence is
evidentially irrelevant to the existence of life onMars. Now, I am leaving aside something
which many philosophers will find deeply relevant to our question, which is the fact that
experiences have content. Some philosophers, of course, will deny this—but I don’t. But
even if I tell you that the experience that the subject is undergoing has a certain content,
and even if I tell you that the content just is that there is a snowball right in front of
her, you should not take that to be evidentially relevant to whether there is indeed a
snowball in front of her. After all, even if I told you that the sentence written in the sand
is “There is life on Mars,” you wouldn’t take that to be evidentially relevant to whether
there is life onMars. Of course, if I told you that someonewho knows a lot about the issue
wrote that sentence down with the intention to inform people, then that would of course
be evidence that there is life on Mars. Similarly, if I told you more about this subject,
perhaps for instance that she belongs to a species that has evolved in and is well adapted
to her environment, or perhaps if I just told you that her experiences are very reliable,
then that might indeed be good evidence that there is a snowball in front of her. But the
resulting theory of evidence is not mentalism, but rather something closer to classical
foundationalism.16 The resulting theory has it that a pair of propositions, namely that a
subject has an experience with the content that p and that the subject’s experiences are
reliable, are evidence for p. The mentalist account has it that the experience itself, not
propositions about it, are the evidence.17
An alternative is that mental states like experience can provide, but do not consist of,
evidence. One version of this alternative adopts Williamson’s equation of evidence with
knowledge and has it that the experience provides the subject with the proposition that
is its content as evidence when the subject knows the proposition on the basis of that
experience. Another version, which I prefer, has it that truth is irrelevant to whether
the experience provides the subject with evidence, and that it does so as long as it pro-
vides her with justified belief. Call this account of evidence, “Propositionalism.”18 Now,
16Which is not to say that some self-avowed evidentialist would not be happy with a theory like this—see,
for instance, McCain (forthcoming).
17The argument in this paragraph is developed in more detail in Comesaña (2015).
18For more on this, see Comesaña and McGrath (2014), Comesaña (2015), Comesaña and McGrath (2016),
and the article by McGrath in this volume.
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this might seem to be viciously circular. After all, we started out with the objective of
giving an account of justified belief, and we ended up with a theory that bottoms out in
evidence which is provided by experiences when they give rise to justified belief. But if
there is any circularity here, it is of a kind that every theory under consideration here
shares. Consider first the mentalist conception of evidence. It holds that experience
provides prima facie justification for a belief in its content, which turns into all things
considered justification when undefeated. Williamson’s view has it that an experience
provides the proposition that is its content as evidence when it provides knowledge—
and that would happen, of course, only if the experience provides justification for belief
in its content. So both mentalism and E = K have it that experiences provide or con-
sist of evidence when they justify belief in their contents. We are all, therefore, in the
same boat when it comes to the project of specifying why and under what conditions ex-
periences provide justified belief in their contents, and none of the three views should
be judged to be viciously circular for holding that the evidential chain begins when that
happens. Every view, then, needs some kind of account of when an experience with the
content that p results in a justified belief that p. I use “results” as a term that is neutral
between the mentalist account of evidence—according to which the experience itself is
evidence for the belief—and theWilliamsonian and Propositionalist accounts, according
to which experience provides us with, but does not consist of, evidence. Let us say that,
when an experience results in a justified belief, the experience is undefeated. Everyone,
then, needs an account of when experience is undefeated. Fortunately, we need not wait
to have such a complete account before we use the notion of undefeated experience in
our theorizing, for we understand perfectly well what that notion means. Now, maybe
Reliabilists have a legitimate complaint here, because they would say that an experience
provides the subject with a justified belief in its content just in case there is a reliable
connection between the subject’s having the experience and the truth of its content. But
this is at best a Reliabilist account of undefeated experience—and likely not a correct one.
Goldman (1979) himself provided a reliabilist account of defeat in general, but it is not
at all clear that he succeeded.
The theory we have arrived at is the following: experiences provide the subject with an
initial corpus of propositions as evidence, and they do so provided that they justify the
subject in believing their contents; this initial corpus of evidence can then justify belief
in a further proposition when the conditional probability of that proposition given a suit-
able subset of the initial corpus is high enough. A natural thought here would be to think
that propositions justified downstream of experience can then join forces with the ba-
sically justified propositions and justify still more propositions, the edifice of justified
propositions growing under its own steam, so to speak. But although this picture is a
very traditional one, I do not think that it withstands scrutiny.19
Suppose that a subject possesses some corpus of propositions E as basic evidence (at a
given time). Suppose, in addition, that 1 > 𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝐸) ≥ 𝑟, so that p is justified for
S by E but not to the maximal degree. Finally, suppose also that although 𝑃𝑟(𝑞|𝑝) ≥
𝑟, 𝑃𝑟(𝑞|𝐸) < 𝑟, so that whereas q is justified for S if p is part of her evidence, it is not
19Sosa (2016) criticized Evidentialist Reliabilism precisely on the basis that it, together with Evidentialism,
assumed that all beliefs are evidentially justified. As the theory of evidence deployed here and developed further
in the articles cited in the previous footnote show, I agree with Sosa.
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if it is merely E that is part of S’s evidence. In that case, the rational credence for S to
have in q is clearly 𝑃𝑟(𝑞|𝐸)—to assign it 𝑃𝑟(𝑞|𝑝) would be irrational overconfidence.20
Moreover, this irrational overconfidence in q can lead to irrational actions. Therefore, we
shouldn’t treat propositions justified by our basic evidence as themselves being part of
our evidence. Our evidence, therefore, consists of those propositions which are justified
for us, but not evidentially justified.
The resulting theory can be formulated as follows:21
Coarse-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilism: A belief that p by S is justi-
fied if and only if:
Either:
1. S’s undefeated experiences provide him with p; or
2a. S’s undefeated experiences provide him with E;
2b. the belief that p by S is based on E;
2c. 𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝐸) ≥ 𝑟.
2d. There is no more inclusive body of evidence E’ had by S such that
𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝐸) < 𝑟.
I call the resulting theory “Coarse-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilism” because it accounts
only for the rationality of coarse-grained doxastic attitudes, and not of fine-grained ones.
In that respect, it is inferior to plain old Evidentialism, which applied to all doxastic atti-
tudes. There is a very natural way, however, to transform Coarse-Grained Evidentialist
Reliabilism into a theory that applies to credences:
Fine-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilism: A credence x in p by S is jus-
tified if and only if:
Either:
1. S’s undefeated experiences provide him with p; or
2a. S’s undefeated experiences provide him with E;
2b. S’s credence x in p is based on E;
2c. 𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝐸) = 𝑥.
2d. There is no more inclusive body of evidence E’ had by S such that
𝑃𝑟(𝑝|𝐸) ≠ 𝑥.
What of the complain, raised before, that the theory conflates justification as firmness
with justification as increase in firmness? The complaint doesn’t apply to Fine-Grained
20The issues here are intimately related to the “easy knowledge” problem—see Cohen (2002).
21The definitions are implicitly relativized to a time. That doesn’t mean that the theory is a version of “time-
slice” epistemology, according to which which doxastic attitudes are justified at a time supervenes on the sub-
ject’s mental states at a time, for it leaves it open that past experiences may provide subjects with present
evidence.
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Evidentialist Reliabilism because it does not deal with a threshold notion of justification.
What we gained by having a theory that applies to credences, however, we lost in that it
no longer applies to full beliefs. Obviously, however, we can join both theories just by
adding that a justified credence x in p counts as justified belief in p if and only if 𝑥 ≥ 𝑟.
This makes it even more explicit than it was before that the conception of justified belief
implicit in Coarse-GrainedEvidentialist Reliabilism follows the Lockean thesis according
to which justified belief just is justified credence above a threshold. An alternative is to
say that the only propositions the subject is justified in fully believing (and not just in
assigning some high credence) are those that are part of her evidence. This also has
obvious costs, but this is not the place to deal with them.22
9. Conclusion
Is Fine-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilism well named? It is in the sense of honoring its
ancestry, but the resulting view is, in important respects, neither Evidentialist nor Relia-
bilists. (It is also, of course, more than a mouthful.)
Starting with Evidentialism, the most fundamental difference between the views is that
Fine-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilism embraces the possibility of non-evidentially jus-
tified beliefs.23 Relatedly, Fine-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilism has it that a subject’s
evidence is constituted exclusively by those propositions provided as evidence by his un-
defeated experiences (remember that we are treating “experiences” as somewhat of a
placeholder for all non-factive mental states which can provide evidence). For the Evi-
dentialist, remember, there are two fundamentally different kinds of evidence: evidence
can consists of propositions, which are had as evidence only if justifiedly believed, or
of experiences, for which there is no distinction between evidence and its possession.
Fine-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilism, on the other hand, has a unified conception of
evidence and its possession. Conversely, whereas for the Evidentialist all propositions
are evidentially justified, for the Fine-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilists some proposi-
tions are justified but not on the basis of any evidence. Both kinds of theory therefore
posit some kind of bifurcation: one in the notion of evidence and its possession, the other
on the ways beliefs can be justified. I have briefly alluded at the arguments for preferring
the second kind of bifurcation. In his contribution to this volume, Matt McGrath concen-
trates on precisely this issue, and mounts an argument against Evidentialism on it.
Fine-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilism replaces the Evidentialist notion of fit with an
appeal to the evidential probability function. So, in this respect, while Fine-Grained Ev-
identialist Reliabilism might not be better off than Evidentialism, it clearly isn’t worse
off. I conceived of the Reliabilist part of Evidentialist Reliabilism as providing an answer
22Christensen (2004) argues that, given those problems, we should just abandon coarse-grained epistemol-
ogy if favor of fine-grained epistemology. Pragmatic encroachment à la Fantl and McGrath (2002) might help
deal with some of the problems, but it is of course itself a very controversial theory.
23That said, if an Evidentialist is happy with saying that the item of evidence is the content of the experience,
and that it is possessed in virtue of the subject’s undergoing the experience, then so be it. I have no problem
with calling my view “Evidentialist”, but I want to make clear what conception of evidence and its possession I
am arguing for.
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to the question of fit, but I didn’t pay sufficient attention to the question of how to mea-
sure reliability. If we measure reliability by an objective probability function, then the
old counterexamples to Reliabilism come back with a vengeance, and the admixture of
Evidentialism will not help. Therefore, while the versions of Reliabilism advocated by
Dunn, Tang and Pettigrew do indeed provide us with a non-circular account of justifi-
cation, that account is simply materially inadequate. Moreover, its material inadequacy
can be traced back precisely to the fact that they conceive of 𝑃𝑟 as a contingent function,
and as such the only justified way to match our credences to it is by learning about those
contingent correlations. But part of what we need to explain when we explain epistemic
justification is precisely how it is that we are justified in learning about those correlations.
An explicit part of Goldman’s project in epistemology is to provide a reductivist account
of epistemic justification. Insofar as the kind of Evidentialist Reliabilism defended here
appeals to the notion of evidential probability, it cannot fulfill that promise. As I see it,
however, reductivism of that kind comes at the cost of material inadequacy.
Fine-Grained Evidentialist Reliabilism is a theory with its own theoretical commitments,
and, I think, well worth exploring.24
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